Abstract
Introduction

1.
Research on harvesting by conducting Common-Pool Resource (CPR) games has often focused on the nature and role of relevant institutions; while more recently, a behavioral economics approach has been increasingly adopted (Anderies et al., 2011) , presenting findings concerning on how individuals process information, how they make decisions and how they respond to changes in incentive structures (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992) . Particularly, in most of the cases, the context adopted is a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), where the predicted outcome is Nash Equilibrium, unless players find ways for tacitly or explicitly cooperating. A popular research strategy has been to study the behavior of subjects in CPR-games with a static baseline framework inspired on a real-world situation relevant to the subjects' every-day decision-making environment. In fact, some authors argue that individual behavior in such contexts reflects subjects' preferences, values, and actual experience with the resource from their daily lives (Cardenas, 2001; Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004) Among the most robust findings these experiments have provided is that communication increases cooperation. This means that, when participants are allowed to communicate face-toface, the harvest declines towards the cooperative equilibrium (Ostrom and Walker, 1991; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994) . Some reasons for explaining this behavior can be found in that communication helps individuals to detect the actions of others with whom they are interacting, allowing individuals to elicit commitments, creating a process of relationship between the harvest in a CPR-game and a fisherman's years of schooling; thus, development of human capital.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a discussion on the relation of TURF's, and how this mechanism influence behavior of inhabitants Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents results. Section 5 provides the conclusions.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF's) in Colombia: ZEPA and DRMI 2.
In Colombia, Law 13 of 1990 proposed Exclusive Areas for Artisanal Fishing (ZEPA for its acronym in Spanish) and Regional Districts for Integrate Management (DRMI for its acronym in Spanish) for managing marine areas of fisheries. This law is proposed for complying with the principles and guidelines of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995) , which establishes a set of principles to guide the management of fisheries resources towards sustainability (Vieira, Diaz, and Diaz, 2016) .
On the one hand, ZEPA process started in July 2008 by defining an area destined to the development of artisanal fishing, traditionally managed by communities inhabiting north coast of Choco Colombia, with initial validity of one year. Later in August 2009, its validity was extended for another year, and in August 2010, for two additional years Finally, declared permanently on July 2013 (MinAgricultura, 2013) . The designation of these 2.5 nautical miles wide between the northern limit of the Utria National Natural Park and the border with the Republic of Panama, alleviated in a certain way the rivalry between artisanal and the industrial fishing region (Diaz and Caro, 2016) .
On the other hand, DRMI process started more that 20 years ago (CODECHOCO et al., 2014 ) materialized in December 2014 (Vieira, Diaz, and Diaz, 2016) , and legally established in October 2017 (MinAgricultura, 2017) . The declaration established a maritime extension of 55,974 hectares for exclusive extractive uses by the inhabitants of north coast of Choco, from Cabo Corrientes to Utria National Natural Park. This declaration aims at regulating gears and arts of fishing in order to promote sustainability of hydro biological resources and other environmental goods and services that support fishing (Vieira, Diaz, and Diaz, 2016) .
The territorial designations of these geographic spaces, which connect to each other, were accompanied by workshops about sustainable exploitation, preservation, restoration, knowledge and enjoyment conducted along the communities. The objective of these workshops aims at maintaining the composition and function of natural capital accordingly to cultural values of inhabiting communities.
These designations are defined as Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF's) with sitespecific management attached to territorial culture. By definition, these are extended economic zones, which rights can be controlled within the territory, with specific conditions for governing access to the resource by communities. TURF-based management systems provide relative rather than absolute controls, preventing the rent dissipation from economic waste due to excess of effort caused at allocating capital and labor (Christy, 1982) . Thereby, under TURF-based management, users are responsible for defining and planning exploitation of resource and controlling access (Wilen, Cancino, and Uchida, 2012) Different studies have found TURF-based management increase compliance behavior of fishers and are supposed to correct the underlying causes of overfishing, the absence of welldefined property rights; although impacts of TURF's on the sustainability of fisheries are subject to debating (Nguyen Thi Quynh et al., 2017) . Nevertheless, some studies have found that TURFbased management coordinate fishing effort with the aim of mitigating inefficient allocation of fishing effort in Japan (Gaspart and Seki 2003) and Chile (Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen, 2007) .
Researches on communication, enforcement, co-management and compliance behavior are the most explore treatments in experimental economics. However, evidence regarding formation of human capital and the influence on behavior in the context of TURF's has not received much attention. Nevertheless, some findings reported from CPR-games conducted in TURF-based areas show that harvest is negatively related to levels of schooling in Marine Protected Areas (MPA) in Colombia (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010), Management and Exploitation Areas of Benthic Resource (MEABR) in Chile (Santis and Chavez, 2015) , and Marine Reservoirs (MR) in Mexico .
Experiment Design 3.
The design aims at studying the behavior of Colombian Pacific fishermen in a CPR-game performed in a field lab. These participants are inhabitants of collective territories, each one with knowledge and entitlement to engage in fishing activity. For this purpose, we use an experimental design similar to Ostrom et al. (1994) and Cardenas (2001) with a modification in the payoffs, without changing the main properties of the original setup. In this experiment, an agent has a range of choices between 1 to 8 units to harvest from a CPR. This choice could also represent units of effort applied to the resource or quantity of inputs used for yielding the resource. 
Experiment protocol 3
The results reported in this study were obtained from pen-and-paper experiments run with 159 fishermen recruited among the communities of the Colombian Pacific Coast during April 2012. 4 In each session, groups of 5 players were formed, each one assisted by a researcher. Before starting the game, the context of the experiment and the rules to follow were presented to fishermen. During these experiments, anonymity was enforced. Decisions were made in secret, and even though many players knew each other, communication during the experiment was strictly forbidden. It was clearly explained to them that individual payoffs at the end of the session would depend on their own and rivals' harvest. All payoffs were made effective at the end of each session. 
Instructions and decisions
Instructions and decisions sheets were provided to each fisherman, on which they had to indicate their harvest level in each period. They also had to annotate individual and aggregate harvest, but they were not offered feedback on the others' individual harvest. They were also offered a payoffs sheet indicating the earnings for different combinations between individual and collective harvest.
Although each session consisted of a 20-period decision-making task, we focus here on the first 10 periods exclusively. Rounds 11-20 were dedicated to other research outside of the scope of this work.
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In this experiment, individual harvest ranged between 1 ≤ x i ≤ 8 and aggregate harvest between 5 ≤ ∑x j ≤ 40 units. Then, as proposed by Cardenas (2001) , individual payoff π i is given by: , ∑ (1) which ranges between a minimum of 50 payoffs when individual harvest x i =1 and aggregate rivals' harvest ∑x j -x i =32, and a maximum of 1730 payoffs when individual harvest x i =8, and aggregate rivals' harvest ∑x j -x i = 4. received earnings from the activity at least once in their lives. The information was privately collected through a semi-structured survey conducted at the end of the experiment. Some other prior descriptive analyses of the experiment are presented in this section. Source: Own elaboration.
Descriptive analysis
Distribution frequency of year of schooling is presented in figure 1 . Particularly, the highestoccurring amount of years of schooling is grade 11. This indicates that the 25% of the participants have already finished high school. The second-most occurring amount of years of schooling is grade 5. This indicates that 15% of the participants have already finished elementary school. In this sample, two fishermen had a non-complete technician course, whereas one fisherman had obtained the technician degree. By running different local regression, we identify nonlinear relationships between harvest and explanatory variables; these patterns exhibit how players behaved during the CPR-game. In figure 2 , Panel a shows that average harvest increases when the difference in payoffs form past round is different than zero. Particularly, harvest tends to increase the higher when payoffs diminish. Panel b shows that players who have more years of schooling display a non-linear pattern of diminishing average harvest.
Statistical analysis
We analyze longitudinal data obtained from individuals making decisions during the experiment, and demographic variables by estimating Pooled OLS clustering for players, random effects (RE) model, and a panel Tobit with lower limit 1 and upper limit 8. We estimated individual x i harvest as dependent variable. Squared lag of difference in payoffs is estimated as independent-explanatory variables. Finally we introduce years of schooling and sex as control variables. The variable years of schooling as a proxy of human capital is transformed into natural logarithms in order to capture the non-linear relation with harvest. Sex, s, is a dichotomous variable that takes values of 1 for male subjects, 0 otherwise. Finally, the squared lag of difference in payoffs identifies how incentives motivate decisions. The results of these estimations are presented in table 2. These results allow us to analyze the behavior of the fishermen during the first 10 rounds of the experiment, were no harvest levels are suggested nor enforced. As stated in the table 2, the years of schooling have a significant effect on players' decision-making during the experiment exhibiting a negative relationship with the harvest.
It is possible to assume that more schooled participants are led to reduce their harvest in the search of higher payoffs through a better understanding of the dynamics of the game, as Boone et al. (2002) state. Thereby, it is possible to conclude that players with more years of schooling assume that reducing harvest produces higher payoffs, and their decisions have led towards the cooperative solution.
We presume that more schooled players make these decisions because of a better understanding of the information provided, and better processing the feedback from their own game interactions. This behavior could be explained by the cognitive advantage schooling brings to more educated players, in information processing and finally maximizing their well-being through problem solving and better adaptation to new situations (Bowen, 1977; Pallas, 2000; Pallas, and Jennings, 2009) . Considering this, the more schooled players can have better understanding of the information presented to them at the beginning of the experiment, especially regarding payoffs and how these are obtained. Due to this, players can have more accurate expectations of other players' decisions.
Furthermore, it is necessary to indicate that during the experiment, it is observed that players who develop basic cognitive abilities had a noticeable advantage for reaching better outcomes over those less schooled players. On the one hand, the less schooled players had some deficiencies in core subjects like reading, writing, and math. This indicates that a short schooling period had some immediate effect on players' performance in the experiment. On the other hand, more schooled players had the ability to improve their results by taking the time to read and analyze the payoffs structure. It should be noted that during the sessions, more schooled players made math operations from time to time during every round, while less schooled players did not.
By analyzing the difference in harvest during the experiment, we notice that tends to accumulate around 0, and strategies tend to remain in the same, deviating no more than 1 unit; on average Δ remains around 0.006, with an interval confidence at 95% significance -0.141< Δ < 0.152; standard deviation 0.075.
This behavior is denominated Schumpeterian ability to deal with payoffs disequilibria, in which players search for more profitable opportunities spatially dispersed in a region around their decision, and relocating at a given rate per period. This search consists in a random decision, in which the quantity of harvest is not subject to enforceable contracts; thus followed by one round of inspection and relocation to a new decision in its immediate neighbors with a higher harvest (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne, 2003) .
However, players differ in their ability to identify and capture these disequilibria due to personal dispositions and capacities attributed to economic return of schooling and the enhancement of these abilities through education; this difference is denominated Allocative Effect of Schooling (Welch, 1970) .
Considering previous findings of Velez et al. (2009), and Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado (2010) , we cannot propose a conclusive reason why their results differ from ours. We can only partially attribute the difference to the context related to TURF-based management in the region in which population studied in our experiments inhabits. We can presume that the process of governance and management of the natural resource performed in the real-world decision-making context faced by our subjects may promote more sustainable exploitation of the resource. Thus, some of players bring this context to the game exhibiting differences from other individuals tested in experiments performed in other Colombian villages.
Regarding sex of player, we observe that women's harvest decisions are less competitive than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) .
The constant in this model provides the individual average harvest of participant when the remaining variables are zero during the rounds 1 to 10 of the experiment. This average ranges from 4.15 to 4.33 depending on the estimation.
Final Remarks 5.
This paper studies the behavior of fishermen from the Colombian Pacific in a CPR-game under a TURF-based management area. The findings show that human capital, measured by the years of schooling, has a significant negative relationship with the harvest. Under these results we consider that more schooled participants will diminish their harvest during the experiment leading to a cooperative solution. This process is endogenous and not motivated by external rules. We presume that the Allocative Effect of Schooling (Welch, 1970) and the effect of workshops conducted promoting sustainability in the region during the process of territorial management designation motivate this behavior.
According to Becker (1964) , Bowen (1977) , and Pallas (2000), formal education enhances the human capital stock by enhancing the ability to solve problems and adapt to new situations. In this experiment, it is observed that more schooled players presented an advantage over less schooled players, because, usually, more schooled players have the ability to effectively process payoffrelevant information, possibly subject to a more efficient strategy searching process.
It is also presumable that higher levels of schooling promote changes in preferences for the environment (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) , and wealth effect promoted by higher human capital may change preferences for the environment in which fishermen are involved. Basically through a mechanism of transmission, we can presume that higher schooling increases the desire of fishermen for having better environmental and resource conditions Finally, the role of sex as a determinant for decision-making does not have conclusive results. Revollo-Fernandez, Aguilar-Ibarra, Saenz-Arroyo and Micheli (2016) provide evidence for a greater cooperative attitude in women by changing their behavior towards lower harvest in the presence of regulations, sanctions or social scolding. However, Maldonado and Barrero (2016) show that sexsplit groups show no statistically significant differences in the overall harvesting, although mixed groups of women and men exhibit lower harvesting of the resource. Nevertheless, Cardenas, Rodriguez and Johnson (2011) show that somehow more sex-homogeneous groups exhibit larger collective contributions. Findings obtained in this current research only allow us arguing that women exhibit less competitive behavior than men in a CPR-game with no enforcement introduced.
